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ABSTRACT. Aboriginal and nonaboriginal fishing-dependent communities on the coast of British Columbia, Canada, having lost
traditional fisheries management institutions along with significant fishing opportunity, are in the process of rebuilding local and
regional institutions to allow their survival. Sometimes, the rebuilding effort involves the creation of largely new institutions. It can
also involve the reactivation, reinvention, or repositioning of older ones. We consider the aspirations, strategies, and activities of
organizations in two regions of the coast involved in two different fisheries: salmon on the north coast and intertidal clams in the
Broughton Archipelago. We analyze what the two regions have in common, as well as their differences, to generate general predictions
and recommendations about what preconditions appear to be necessary for success in rebuilding institutions in communities and regions
at these scales and what actions are likely to be most effective, according to a body of literature on self-management and comanagement.
In both cases, we found favorable conditions in the communities, the external political arena, and in government to support the rebuilding
goals of the organizations working in the two regions. Although both areas would benefit from greater financial resources, the most
critical need is for external support in the form of alliances, issue networks, and access to multiple sources of power.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last four decades, long-established aboriginal and
nonaboriginal fishing communities on the British Columbia (BC)
coast have been undergoing radical loss of fishing licenses, vessels,
and opportunity, and also of the government presence and
infrastructure that formerly supported local fishing activities.
These losses have been concentrated in more rural and northern
regions of the province (Ecotrust 2004), the very regions that are
most dependent on fishing livelihoods, have the fewest
occupational alternatives, and hold the largest number of
aboriginal fishers who in theory enjoy constitutionally protected
access rights. These losses resulted directly and indirectly from
government policies seeking to rationalize, i.e., reduce, the number
of licenses and vessels to reduce fishing pressure in response to
conservation concerns and to meet economic objectives of
improving the financial viability of fishing enterprises, allowing
for what the government perceived as more effective management
(Fisheries and Oceans Canada 1990).  
Before we contemplate rebuilding local and regional fisheries
management institutions, we must first consider the full nature
and extent of these losses. Maritime resources, fishing and salmon
in particular, were the backbone of the economy, society, and
culture of Pacific Northwest peoples for upwards of 10,000 years
(Inglis and MacDonald 1979, Muckle 2007). This fundamental
social-ecological relationship held true in rural coastal BC until
the final decade of the 20th century, in spite of enormous upheaval
and loss occasioned by nonaboriginal settlement in the region
over the past 150 years (Barman 1991, Newell 1993, Harris 2008,
Turner et al. 2013).  
Since the late 1960s, the federal government in Canada has been
unwinding the social contract that made Canadian sovereignty
of the Pacific coast from Washington State to Alaska a reality in
the first place. For example, when First Nations on the BC coast
were allocated reserves by government negotiators roughly a
hundred years ago, they received miniscule allotments relative to
their traditional territories, notwithstanding the objections of
aboriginal people to the process and the results (Harris 2008). The
logic of government negotiators was that aboriginal people would
support themselves by fishing (Pinkerton 1987, Ommer 2007).
After World War I, returning Canadian soldiers were encouraged
to settle on the north coast of BC in return for fishing licenses
(Marchak et al. 1987, Meggs 1991). Both of these contracts have
now been abandoned by government, starting with the Davis
Plan’s elimination of all boats delivering less than $2500 worth of
fish per year. 
The goals of this discussion are to (1) consider what the
comanagement literature says about critical conditions necessary
for successful local institutional rebuilding; (2) identify what
institutional losses have occurred as a consequence of this policy
direction; (3) examine the vision, strategies, and actions being
taken in two regions of the BC coast where organizations are
building or rebuilding institutions to retain and reclaim access
and management rights to their local fisheries; and (4) consider
what communities interested in rebuilding their institutions can
learn from experiences elsewhere, e.g., with what priorities might
particular strategies be effective?
THEORY AND METHODS
What does comanagement contribute to rebuilding collapsed
institutions or their alternatives, and why is it important to
rebuild?
We begin with a brief  consideration of what the comanagement
literature contributes to insights regarding rebuilding collapsed
institutions or their alternatives. From the late 1970s onward, an
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older literature from anthropology and ecology on the self-
regulating capacities of contemporary fishing communities
(Acheson 1975, Berkes 1981) has been integrated into a newer
literature on the benefits of power sharing between self-regulating
communities and government agencies (Pinkerton 1989, Wilson et
al. 1994, Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995, Wilson et al. 2003,
Armitage et al. 2007). We consider comanagement to be power
sharing that involves not only access and withdrawal rights
(operational level), but also higher-level rights such as harvest
management, exclusion, and coordination with other users
(collective choice). Given the legal mandate of the Canadian federal
government to manage fisheries, the necessity of coordinating
actions with neighbors, and conflicting uses of fish, e.g.,
commercial, aboriginal, and recreational fisheries, and marine
space, e.g., tourism, shipping, aquaculture, and oil and gas
development, self-regulation obviously requires coordination with
and integration into comanagement arrangements between local/
regional institutions and the Canadian Department of Fisheries
and Oceans (DFO).  
Any institutional capacity lacking in one of these power-sharing
entities has to be supplied by another. In a resource system like BC’s
fisheries, in which the senior level of government has both the
constitutional authority and fiscal ability to dictate the terms under
which fisheries management is carried out, the scope for
comanagement is limited unless government chooses to embrace
that option. In recent years, with the reduction in fishermen’s union
membership associated with the loss of fishing licenses, the most
important check on DFO’s exercise of authority is the existence of
legally protected aboriginal rights to subsistence and, to a lesser
degree, commercial fisheries (Ahousaht First Nation vs. Canada
2007, Ahousaht et al. vs. Canada 2013). The exercise of these rights
is restrained by the limited financial, administrative, and technical
resources in most aboriginal coastal communities in northern BC
and in the Broughton Archipelago off  northern Vancouver Island.
However, beginning in the late 1990s (Lane and Stephenson 2000),
federal government cutbacks and legislative changes, most recently
in the Jobs, Growth and Long-term Prosperity Act and the Jobs
and Growth Act of 2012, have undermined DFO’s capacity and
weakened its legitimacy. This has created an opportunity for
institutional rebuilding along comanagement lines, as illustrated in
our two case studies.  
In the context of these changes to the DFO, the rebuilding or
creation of local management institutions could become the
foundation for potentially enduring comanagement relationships,
both among regional organizations or communities that must work
together and between regionally based groups and the DFO. The
literature cited above documents important contributions to
fisheries management by rebuilt institutions (Pinkerton 1989,
Wilson et al. 1994, Pinkerton and Weinstein 1995, Wilson et al.
2003, Armitage et al. 2007), including (1) a higher degree of trust
between fishermen’s organizations and government and greater
willingness on the part of government to allow fishermen’s
organizations to undertake a range of self-management
responsibilities; (2) a willingness among both fishing communities
and government to share data and local knowledge about the
resource and, therefore, to reach collectively a more complete
understanding of the resource; (3) a willingness among both
fishermen’s organizations and government to explore more effective
options for regulation and enhancement; (4) an improved ability to
develop and successfully enforce regimes that fishermen perceive
as appropriate and legitimate; (5) development of fisheries with
greater equity, effectiveness, and legitimacy, and thus greater
compliance, in fishermen’s organizations and communities; and
(6) reduced costs of health care, welfare, and unemployment
because more fishermen will be actively involved in management
and fishing activities. The last improvement might not affect the
senior government department managing fisheries, but it would
have significant impacts on the costs of health care and welfare
borne by other government departments. It has been well
documented that aboriginal communities able to pursue
traditional livelihoods and experience cultural continuity have
fewer health problems and lower suicide rates (Chandler and
Lalonde 2009, Campbell et al. 2011), resulting in lower costs to
government.  
The research reported here was funded by two different Canadian
scholarly programs, both of which supported research founded
on partnerships with coastal communities or organizations. The
research in case study 1 was funded by a Natural Science and
Engineering Research Council industry-driven grant undertaken
with the Canadian Council of Professional Fish Harvesters (the
Canadian Fisheries Research Network, http://www.cfrn-rcrp.ca/
Public-Home-EN); case study 1 included an agreement between
the United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union (UFAWU, now
amalgamated with UNIFOR: UFAWU-UNIFOR) and
university researchers. The north coast regional focus of this study
took in a diverse range of aboriginal and nonaboriginal
communities, governments, and fishing organizations. The
information presented in case study 1 draws from a combination
of informal interviews, participant observation (2010-2013), and
data from secondary sources.  
The research in case study 2 was funded by a Social Science and
Humanities Research Council Partnership Development Grant
to Simon Fraser University and the Musgamagw Dzawada’enuxw
Tribal Council, comprising four Kwakwaka’wakw tribes. The
focus in this study was on a much smaller region than the first
case, consisting entirely of aboriginal, i.e., First Nations,
communities. Case study 2 drew primarily from semistructured
interviews with 14 community members, as well as participant
observation in 2012 and data from secondary sources.  
In both cases the nonuniversity partners played a major role in
defining the research goals and are working with the university
partners to achieve those goals. These two cases illustrate a range
of institutional rebuilding strategies at different geographic and
membership scales, degrees of membership diversity, breadth of
issues, types of rights, complexity of species mix, and stages of
development.
CASE STUDY 1: THE SUSTAINABLE MARINE
FISHERIES AND COMMUNITIES ALLIANCE ON THE
BC NORTH COAST
Institutional losses in the north coast salmon fishery
As nonaboriginal workers and settlers put down roots on the
north coast over the course of the last century, they, like aboriginal
peoples, were sustained by harvesting the year-round abundance
of marine resources in the area. Salmon, halibut, and herring were
the preeminent cash and food sources; other groundfish species,
eulachon, shellfish, and seaweeds filled in the seasonal round
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Table 1. Skeena River sockeye salmon (Oncorhynchus nerka) harvest trends, 1973-2012 (Pacific Salmon Commission 2011, 2012, English
2012, English et al. 2012; Skeena Salmon Program 2012, unpublished data). FSC is First Nations’ harvest for food, social, and ceremonial
purposes.
 
Decade Total Run Alaska harvest Return to
Canada
FSC Marine harvest In-river
harvest
Uncategorized harvest
1973-1982 2,439,040 152,071 2,286,970 n/a 988,905 n/a 344,575
1983-1992 3,129,230 406,041 2,723,188 149,067 964,935 n/a 429,969
1993-2002 3,671,018 390,085 3,280,213 138,872 1,274,184 248,320 379,425
2003-2012 1,830,790 144,129 1,686,661 142,215 346,526 128,789 84,459
(Muckle 2007, Angel 2011). Extraction industries like forestry
and mining had their moments, booms, and busts, as befits a
commodity-driven economy, but life on the north coast continued
to revolve around fishing as the primary activity (Meggs 1991,
Rajala 2006). In parallel, many of the important local institutions
belonged to fishermen, including province-wide organizations
like the UFAWU and the Native Brotherhood of BC. Both
developed strong reciprocal ties to north coast communities. The
UFAWU and the Brotherhood drew heavily on Prince Rupert and
environs for members, often in competition with one another
(Drucker 1958). In return, they trained several generations of
community leaders: mayors, chiefs, councilors, businessmen, and
educators.  
The large membership of the two organizations made for
considerable influence in the fishing industry (Lyons 1969, North
1974, Meggs 1991). In addition to negotiating prices with the
processing companies and taking their members out on strike if
necessary, the UFAWU and the Native Brotherhood of BC had
a voice in the management of the fishery through their
participation in an advisory body called the Skeena River Salmon
Management Committee. Established by the DFO in the early
1960s (Wright 2010), the committee is what we would now
recognize as an early-stage comanagement institution. Meeting
several times a year, commercial, recreational, and aboriginal
representatives had an opportunity to review, comment on, and
challenge fishing plans and regulations, stock assessments, habitat
protection and enhancement, and catch and landings data, which
represent a substantial range of fisheries management functions.
Indeed, the committee and its successor, the North Coast
Advisory Board, developed over the decades into important
regional institutions in their own right (UFAWU-UNIFOR,
Prince Rupert office, personal communication). 
In the mid-1990s, amidst a climate of fiscal retrenchment and
heightened environmental concern, the federal government began
to overhaul its management of salmon fisheries in BC. The first
step, under what was known as the Mifflin Plan, was a 42%
reduction in commercial salmon licenses, along with reduced
access to fisheries through gear and area licensing changes
(Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2002, Brown 2005). The rationale
was economic efficiency; the consequence was a substantial
transfer of assets, i.e., licenses, infrastructure, and population,
from rural to urban British Columbia (Ecotrust 2004). With the
Mifflin Plan under way at a cost to government of hundreds of
millions of dollars (Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2002), the DFO
adopted a policy known colloquially as weak stock management,
under which fisheries are managed to protect weaker stocks at the
expense of opportunities to harvest more productive stocks. Here,
the rationale was a conservation crisis, in particular, an alarming
decline in the numbers of coho salmon (Oncorhynchus kisutch)
returning to spawn (Holtby and Finnegan 1997, Fisheries and
Oceans Canada 1998a, Brown 2005).  
Responding in part to increasing pressure from environmental
and recreational groups, which have at times allied themselves
with inland First Nations, the department has continued to reduce
harvesting in favor of increasing spawner escapement throughout
the Skeena system (Table 1). At the same time, there has been a
transfer of access and withdrawal privileges to upriver
recreational and aboriginal fisheries (Fisheries and Oceans
Canada 1998-2012, Fisheries and Oceans Canada 1999, Walters
et al. 2008). This reallocation of benefits from the fishery has
taken place amidst a weakened consultation process. In 2005, the
North Coast Advisory Board was replaced by a new body called
the Integrated Harvest Planning Committee. Although more
inclusive in its composition in that conservation interests have a
formal place at the table, the Integrated Harvest Planning
Committee has been criticized by participants as a highly
politicized forum in which groups focus on positioning rather than
cooperation and compromise. With the imminent implementation
of the department’s Wild Salmon Policy (Fisheries and Oceans
Canada 2005) on the Skeena, the evidence points to an
intensifying of weak stock management approaches and a
continued shift of harvesting to terminal areas, where the different
salmon stocks spawn at the end of their run.  
The negative socioeconomic effects of the DFO’s increasingly
risk-averse fisheries management practices on the north coast
have been felt most strongly in coastal communities, aboriginal
and nonaboriginal, where dependence on commercial salmon
fishing has long been the mainstay of local economies (Sinclair
1971, ARA Consulting Group 1996, Gislason et al. 1998, Jones
et al. 2004). As a highly respected fisheries scientist pointed out
in presentations to the DFO and commercial fishermen in the
summer of 2012, the foregone harvests on Skeena sockeye stocks
are worth millions of dollars to the fishing industry and the
ecological benefits of weak stock management are very limited
(C. J. Walters, unpublished Powerpoint presentation to the Area C
harvesters and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Prince
Rupert, British Columbia, Canada, July 2012). These unrealized
landings mean less employment, less income, and less spending
in coastal communities. This translates into fewer boats on the
water, failing businesses, and decaying marine infrastructure. In
turn, there is outmigration, especially among younger people
entering the workforce, meaning fewer community leaders with
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Table 2. Sustainable Marine Fisheries and Communities Alliance’s initial membership (2008) and subsequent participants (2008-2012;
Thorkelson 2012, City of Prince Rupert 2013). See Figure 1 for locations of names in parentheses.
 
Type Name Location
First Nations 2008: Gingolx, Gitga’at (Hartley Bay), Gitxaala (Kitkatla), Kitselas
(Terrace), Kitsumkalum (Terrace), Lax Kw’alaams, Metlakatla,
Nisga’a Lisims. Later: Council of Haida Nation, Heiltsuk (Bella
Bella), Old Massett, Skidegate, Wuikinuxv (River’s Inlet)
North Coast, Nass River, Lower
Skeena River, Haida Gwaii, Central
Coast
Local Governments 2008: City of Prince Rupert, Skeena Queen Charlotte Regional
District, District of Port Edward
North Coast and Haida Gwaii
Organizations 2008: Native Brotherhood of BC, Northern Native Fishing
Corporation, United Fishermen and Allied Workers Union, North
Coast Skeena First Nations Stewardship Society
North Coast
decades of experience in the marine environment to make a case
for the importance of protecting the ecosystem.  
At least three negative feedback loops can be seen at work here,
nested at different scales. First, loss of fishing opportunity
diminishes the influence of commercial fishermen in the
management system, which leads to further reductions in access.
At a broader scale, the reduced economic, cultural, and social
benefits flowing to communities from commercial fishing
weakens popular interest in and support for the industry as a vital
activity in the region, further undermining the institutions and
actions that maintain the flow of benefits from fishing. Finally,
at the scale of social-ecological interactions, the gap left by the
decline of commercial fishing leaves the region vulnerable to
arguments in favor of anything that will produce jobs, whatever
the risk to marine and terrestrial ecosystems, which in turn reduces
the value of the environment as a productive resource. For
example, case study 2 shows the denial by government that salmon
farms pollute clam beaches. That this third stage has not yet come
to pass is arguably because of the continued importance of fishing
on the north coast, however diminished it is now compared with
20 years ago. However, as the experience in Newfoundland
demonstrates, coastal communities can make a radical shift from
a capture fishing-centered suite of livelihoods to an oil and gas
or aquaculture economy in little more than a generation
(Bavington 2010, Sinclair 2012).
Vision, strategies, and actions: counterbalancing the DFO
through alliance building
When the shift to increasing spawning escapement was getting
under way in the mid to late 1990s, there were attempts by
governments and stakeholders to create local management
institutions that could help to resolve allocation issues (Skeena
Watershed Committee 1996, Pinkerton 1996, 2009, Fisheries and
Oceans Canada 1998b). Since the collapse of these initiatives after
just a few years, partly through recreational sector lobbying
becoming more powerful, the DFO has increasingly favored
market mechanisms such as catch shares as a solution to many of
the management issues it faces on the north coast (Schwindt et
al. 2003, Butler 2008, Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2008, 2009,
2012).  
In 2008, a coalition of north and central coast First Nations’
governments, municipal governments, and commercial
fishermen’s organizations formed the Sustainable Marine
Fisheries and Communities Alliance, hereafter the north coast
group, in a bid to counterbalance those trends through lobbying,
collaborative research, proposals, and initiatives to comanage or
take over selected fisheries management functions. The initial
membership of the alliance, dating from a series of meetings in
May and June 2008, drew on communities and organizations close
to or based in Prince Rupert. Since then, the organization has
extended its membership to include communities in the Haida
Gwaii archipelago and First Nations on the central coast as far
south as Cape Caution (Table 2 and Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Coastal British Columbia areas represented by
Sustainable Marine Fisheries and Communities Alliance (A)
and Musgamagw Dzawada’enuxw Tribal Council (B).
The following discussion considers the extent to which the
activities of the north coast group constitute aspiring comanager
behavior, as opposed to interest group lobbying in a landscape
crowded with the latter. Primary data were collected through
informal interviews and conversations with participants in the
organization and through observation of several meetings, over
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Table 3. Fisheries management functions and Sustainable Marine Fisheries and Communities Alliance (SMFCA) goals and activities,
2008-2012 (Government of British Columbia 2010, Fernandes 2011, Thorkelson 2012, City of Prince Rupert 2013; SMFCA 2010,
personal communication, unpublished documents). “Yes” in table below indicates that SMFCA is engaged in a particular activity.
 
Primary function Subfunction Comanaging Lobbying
Planning Building Doing
Policy making and evaluation Scoping problems Yes Yes
Setting objectives Yes
Conducting research Yes Yes
Consulting user and interest groups Yes
Making policies Yes
Long range planning Yes Yes
Evaluating policies Yes
Conservation & Productivity Habitat monitoring Yes Yes
Habitat protection Yes
Habitat restoration Yes
Habitat enhancement Yes
Stock assessment Yes Yes
Stock enhancement Yes Yes
Managing access Allocation Yes Yes Yes
Licensing Yes Yes
Membership transfers Yes Yes
Harvest management Planning Yes Yes
In-season management Yes Yes Yes Yes
Monitoring Yes Yes Yes
Enforcement Yes Yes
Adding value Supply management Yes
Traceability & certification Yes Yes
Product diversification Yes Yes
Resource use coordination Planning involving multiple fisheries Yes Yes
Ecosystem management
Communications & Education Consensus building Yes Yes Yes
Public education
Human resources Retain fishermen Yes Yes
Upgrade skills Yes
Train new entrants Yes
the course of five research trips to Prince Rupert and the
surrounding region from 2010 to 2013. Field notes were combined
with written documentation from secondary sources.  
Table 3 conceptualizes a two-level hierarchy of fisheries
management functions, all of which are amenable to
comanagement in theory and for which comanagement has been
observed in practice (Schlager and Ostrom 1993, Pinkerton and
Weinstein 1995). Mapped onto the classification scheme are four
columns categorizing the north coast group’s activities according
to whether or not they relate to comanaging at the stage of
planning, building capacity, implementing (“doing” in Table 3),
or lobbying. What is most striking is the gap between planning
and doing: the members of the north coast group envision taking
on a comanagement role in 26 of 30 aspects of salmon fisheries
management, but the ability to do so to date has been limited to
5 aspects.  
The most obvious explanation for the discrepancy between
aspirations, or planning, and immediate accomplishments, or
doing, is the complexity of what the coalition is trying to
accomplish. Meeting in full once or twice a year since 2008,
participants spend much time simply building agreement on
contentious issues. Divisions stretching back decades or more
among aboriginal groups and between the UFAWU and the
Native Brotherhood of BC are a challenging legacy to overcome.  
A closer look (Table 4) at the priority goals identified by the north
coast group and the strategies the organization and its
membership have used to build capacity and implement plans
reveals substantial barriers to progress: limited resources, lack of
trust between the marine commercial fisheries sector and upriver
recreational and aboriginal fisheries, loss of capacity in
government, and conflicts with government priorities. 
Finally, the continued emphasis on lobbying shown in Table 3,
especially in relation to access and harvest management functions
in the fishery, suggests that the barriers to progress are substantial
enough that recourse to lobbying is at this stage unavoidable,
however ambitious the vision of cultural and institutional change
may be. This should come as no surprise because the north coast
group is still in the early stages of a long-term strategic plan to
rebuild fisheries management institutions. The great strength of
the group is that the membership knows what a successful fishery
used to look like. Their challenge, as one participant expressed it,
is to rebuild what they had with a different and better system.
CASE STUDY 2: ABORIGINAL PEOPLE IN THE
BROUGHTON ARCHIPELAGO
Institutional losses in the Broughton clam fishery
Traditionally, Kwakwaka’wakw people used a complex system of
de facto protocols to govern natural resources such as clams,
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Table 4. Sustainable Marine Fisheries and Communities Alliance (SMFCA) priority goals, strategies, and barriers (Thorkelson 2012,
City of Prince Rupert 2013; SMFCA 2010, personal communication, unpublished documents). DFO = Canadian Department of Fisheries
and Oceans.
 
Priority Goals Strategies Barriers
Protect the resource and increase
productivity
Improve habitat monitoring, protection and
restoration
Weakened legislative protection; government cutbacks;
SMFCA members’ lack of resources
Implement Alaska style ocean ranching DFO refusal to discuss; lack of resources to develop
proposal
Negotiate new and lasting allocation
arrangements
Make agreement with sports groups & take to
government together
Mutual antagonism and lack of trust; limited incentives
to cooperate
Make agreement with inland First Nations and
take to government together
Lack of trust; historical grievances
Expand aboriginal role in
monitoring, compliance, traceability,
harvest management
Pursue partnerships with NGO’s to develop
capacity through training and small-scale
management initiatives
Capacity limitations with SMFCA membership,
especially financial in short term (costly and difficult
DFO certification requirements)
Improve socioeconomics for
fishermen and fishing communities
Help drive research that can influence harvest
management decision rules and policy making
DFO commitment to weak stock management; lack of
DFO capacity to understand and incorporate socio-
economic research in planning
primarily Butter, Saxidomus gigantea, and Littleneck, Leukoma
staminea, clams, and clam gardens. Protocols are what Schlager
and Ostrom (1993) call rules governing the operational-level, i.e.,
accessing and withdrawing, and collective-choice, i.e.,
management and exclusion, rights to common-pool resources.
For instance, Rohner (1967:61) documents that in the eulachon
fishery, “certain tribes had fishery rights at specific locations but
not at others.” Kwakwaka’wakw people interviewed by Heaslip
(2008a) identified protocols related to access, management,
exclusion, and stewardship of beaches and clam populations. For
example, a protocol might require a clam digger to ask permission
of a beach owner before digging on a particular beach and incur
some responsibilities to the owner as to how the harvest was
conducted. Our research team is currently working to document
and compile a comprehensive list of clam fishery protocols in the
Broughton Archipelago. 
Historically, the Musgamagw Dzawada’enuxw (hereafter the
Broughton clam group) and other Kwakwaka’wakw First
Nations governed the use of an abundance of marine resources,
including several species of Pacific salmon, herring, eulachons,
halibut and other groundfish, seals, sea lions, sea otters, porpoises,
kelp, clams, mussels, crabs, and other shellfish (Codere 1950). The
Broughton Archipelago has always been the breadbasket of the
Broughton clam group. Clam gardens are a form of traditional
mariculture developed by Kwakwaka’wakw and other First
Nations on the BC coast to manage clam populations (Williams
2006). Empirical and experimental evidence has shown that clam
gardens likely increased clam productivity (Groesbeck 2013).
Evidence of their significance as a traditional management
practice for Kwakwaka’wakw people inhabiting the Broughton
Archipelago can be seen by the fact that 350 of these clam
“terrace” locations have been documented along 5%-10% of the
region’s rocky coastline (Harper et al. 1995).  
Institutional knowledge and practice of traditional protocols
have weakened as a result of interventions in marine resource
management during the colonial and postcolonial eras. Since first
European contact in 1792, Kwakwaka’wakw nations’ communal
management systems have been overwhelmed by their loss of
regular access to a diversity of marine resources. By the early
1960s, commercial fishing for salmon and intertidal clams served
as the primary income source for 18 of the 24 men living in the
clam group’s village of Gwayasdums on Gilford Island; 8 of them
owned gillnet boats (Rohner 1967). By 2012, the combination of
fleet rationalization and other policies left only one person from
Gwayasdums, who resides in Victoria, with a salmon license.  
British Columbia saw a rapid influx of commercial harvesters
entering the intertidal clam fishery during the 1980s, and by 1988
landings of all clam species had peaked (Fisheries and Oceans
Canada 1998c). At this point, the accumulated stocks on most
beaches along the province’s coast had been removed and the
DFO began implementing more restrictive management
measures with reduced harvest times (Fisheries and Oceans
Canada 1998c). We hypothesized that in areas such as the
Broughton Archipelago, these high commercial landings of clams
were only made possible by exploiting the clam abundance created
through historical management of clam beaches by aboriginal
people. Thus, the federal government’s failure to understand the
significance of traditional management practices in conserving
clam stocks or to develop an appropriate alternative has resulted
in a steady decline in stock abundance. Intertidal clams were the
last fishery to be separately licensed as a limited entry fishery, in
1998, and it is the only remaining fishery in which Broughton
clam group members participate significantly.  
In addition to fleet rationalization, the DFO’s territorial
boundaries for clam management ignored the tribes’ traditional
territorial boundaries for management based on protocols. This
created challenges for exercising traditional management
institutions, although politically skilled elders were able to
compensate to some extent and for some time as protocols were
initially adapted for the commercialized clam fishery.  
The DFO’s management approach continues to have drastic
effects on the traditional clam management system. The science-
based monitoring techniques used to inform the DFO’s
management decisions do not include traditional ecological
knowledge of the health of the clam stocks, which differs from
that of the DFO (Heaslip 2008b). Kwakwaka’wakw are
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Table 5. Broughton clam group members’ identification of problems in clam management.
 
Issues Causes Community Concerns
Failures in
Habitat Protection and
Change
Salmon aquaculture Beaches damaged by farmed salmon feces
Blackening or discoloration of clams
Declining beach quality - mucky, thicker, stinky
Slower growth/die offs of clams near fish farms
Sewage Harvest closures near village’s sewage outfall
Sewage waste from float houses
Accidents releasing oil Oil leaks from boats
Fear of potential oil spills
Greenhouse gases Changes in seasons due to climate change
Harvest Management
Failures
Overharvesting in commercial
fisheries
Over-harvesting by diggers
Some diggers prioritize short-term income over long-term sustainability of the fishery
All fisheries in the region have declined due to overharvesting or re-allocation (salmon,
halibut)
Breakdown in the observation
of traditional practices
Neither aboriginal people nor outsiders any longer respect traditional land ownership
and protocols: not seeking permission to harvest
Monitoring and enforcement Little monitoring by DFO or others
Stock assessment by consulting firm includes data from beaches closed for
contamination, producing inaccurate representation of stocks accessible to the fishery
Harvesting on closed beaches and mislabeling beach information on clam sack tags
Multiple diggers illegally using single license
Undersized clams are being harvested
Too many licenses are distributed
concerned that salmon aquaculture waste pollutes their clam
beaches (Heaslip 2008b). In recent years, clam stock assessments
have not been a federal priority, so the Broughton clam group
lacks area wide clam stock status information. The DFO
(Fisheries and Oceans Canada 2010) recognizes that illegal clam
harvesting presents health, safety, and conservation concerns. In
the Broughton Archipelago, illegal harvesting occurs largely
because of unmonitored harvesting on closed contaminated
beaches, unlicensed harvesters, and improper reporting, e.g.,
mislabeled clam sack tags.  
Aboriginal capacity to monitor and enforce traditional
management protocols, thus maintaining a sustainable clam
fishery, was diminished by the loss of salmon fishing licenses and
boats, which had given them access to the territory. In the absence
of DFO capacity to monitor and enforce federal regulations, the
four nations in the Broughton clam group, Dzawada’enuxw,
Gwawa’enuxw, and two nations amalgamated into Kwickwasut’inuxw
Haxwa’mis, are taking actions to reestablish past traditional
management protocols, with the vision of implementing a
management structure that meets their need to ensure the
stewardship of these valuable shellfish areas.
Vision, strategies, and actions: reasserting protocols
The Broughton clam group asserts the need to have control over
local natural resources and to protect the territory by exercising
their traditional management protocols. Community leadership
has indicated that while the clam fishery generates a comparatively
small amount of revenue versus other fisheries, it remains critical
to the survival of the communities as their last remaining
commercial fishery. The majority of the more than 200 clam
beaches in DFO-designated Clam Area G fall within the
traditional territories of the four clam group nations, which
together are administered by the Musgamagw Dzawada’enuxw
Tribal Council. Cumulatively, these four nations have more than
800 registered members, approximately half  of whom live outside
the community, often because of lack of housing and jobs. Their
three inhabited villages, Gwayasdums, Gwayi, and Heghums, are
connected to regional urban centers only by sea or air.  
Since 2001, the Broughton clam group has been working
alongside other Kwakwaka’wakw nations in requesting increased
formal rights through a proposed clam board comanaged with
the DFO (Pacific Regional Clam Management Committee 2001).
However, in recent years DFO representatives have wavered in
their support for such a board, at one point seeking to temporarily
take the idea off  the table by stating that they were supportive but
“sources of DFO funding support for such boards was very
limited and not identified for the Area G fishery at this time”
(Pacific Regional Clam Management Committee 2007:3).
Although the DFO has granted the majority of clam fishery
access and withdrawal rights to aboriginal people in the
Broughton Archipelago and are continuing to discuss a possible
consultative clam management board, they have not yet
recognized the legitimacy and effectiveness that local
management has in sustaining the fisheries resource (Pinkerton
and John 2008) and the importance of involving aboriginal
communities in all stages of management decisions and practices
(Turner et al. 2013), i.e., comanagement. Management does not
operate in a contextual and historical vacuum. Successful
comanagement actively seeks to learn from, adapt to, and
reincorporate local knowledge and traditional management
protocols, which previously formed the basis of the demonstrably
sustainable management of a First Nations’ fishery that existed
for thousands of years. 
In Tables 5 and 6 we summarize (1) the Broughton clam group’s
identification of clam management problems and (2) their goals,
perceived barriers, and proposed strategies to address these
problems. We focused on the community historically known as
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Table 6. Priority goals, strategies, and barriers in implementing local clam management strategies as identified by Broughton clam
group members. DFO = Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans.
 
Priority Goals Proposed Strategies for the tribal council Barriers
Reinstating protocols Hire a cultural advisor/ Teach youth about protocols
Gather in cultural centers (big houses) to discuss the
protocols
Recognition of staffing constraints within tribal
council
Short-term funding requirements
Increase communication Within the clam group nations
With other aboriginal and nonaboriginal fishers
With government (DFO)
Require clam diggers communicate with the clam group
about digging in the territory
Recognition of staffing constraints within tribal
council
Grievances with other aboriginal and
nonaboriginal fishers
Lack of DFO staffing capacity and commitment
to meet more regularly
Increase capacity to monitor and
enforce local management
Seek funding
Hire and train fisheries guardians and biologists
Purchase a boat for fisheries guardians
Map clam beaches
Uncertainty of short-term funding opportunities
Collaborate with DFO on a new
management strategy
Work to ensure management plans reflect community
values and interests
Lack of consensus between DFO and
Kwakwaka’wakw nations
DFO’s use of standardized clam management
board framework
the clam capital of the area (Rohner 1967), Gwayasdums, where
Percy Williams and Neil Ladell conducted interviews with 14
Kwickwasut’inuxw Haxwa’mis Broughton clam group members
during five weeks of residence there in June and July 2012.
Interviewees included elected councilors, an elder, active and
retired clam harvesters, and other community members. The
information provided in these tables underscores community
members’ perceptions that reinstating protocols is critical for
overcoming current failures in clam management.
DISCUSSION
The north coast and Broughton clam group cases exemplify
efforts to build or rebuild comanagement institutional
arrangements at different geographic scales, membership scales,
and degrees of membership diversity, across a varying breadth of
issues, diverse types of rights being asserted, complexities of
species mix, and stages of development. Although in many ways
the two case studies are not comparable, their participants do face
some of the same institutional losses and barriers to rebuilding;
they also experience some of the same conditions that have been
identified as leading to comanagement success. Because the north
coast group is much larger in geographic and membership scale
and because it benefits from long-established leadership and
resources from two historically powerful province-wide fishing
organizations (UFAWU and the Native Brotherhood of BC), it
exhibits strength in some areas that is absent in the Broughton
clam group. On the other hand, the Broughton clam group
operates in a more homogeneous environment and with fewer
species, so it exhibits strength through its cultural cohesiveness
and its strong agreement on issue definition and priorities. Table
7 summarizes the institutional losses, as well as visions, strategies,
and actions being taken to rebuild institutions, in the two cases. 
The comanagement and self-management literature about the
most critical conditions for successful local institutional
rebuilding identifies the following conditions for successful
comanagement, each of which appears relevant to one or the other
of the two cases. These are summarized in Tables 8 and 9 as
resources held and actions taken.
Conditions in communities and regions
1. Existence of strong identification with place. Communities
of place have the greatest likelihood of being willing to
monitor poaching, overharvesting, and pollution and to
protect places from these things over the long term. In many
aboriginal communities, moral teachings about proper
behavior are encoded in local landscapes (Basso 1996) or
are part of spiritual beliefs about the natural word,
developed over time and transmitted through myth, ritual,
and an intensely personal and emotional worldview that
encapsulates critical information about long-term survival
in local landscapes and ecosystems (Anderson 1996, Berkes
1999, Atleo 2011). Such attachment to place constitutes an
invaluable asset when it can be linked to local rule making
about sustainable fishing practices (Pinkerton and John
2008, Lepofsky 2009, Caldwell et al. 2012). 
2. Existence of strong local community values that influence
perceptions and actions. As an extension of condition 1,
aboriginal beliefs are logical components of worldviews that
are often powerful mechanisms for conservation because
they inculcate values that promote individual restraint rather
than solely rational calculations of material gain. To the
community, the purpose of management is the sustainable
and reliable provision of community food and material
needs. Langdon (2007) illustrates how such values are based
on a mythic charter, or contract between fishing
communities and the species, which are believed to remain
abundant only if  treated according to values of sustainable
use, e.g., not wasting or taking more than needed.
Nonaboriginal communities likewise can have both strong
identification with place and also community values that
lead them to manage sustainably, usually through local rule
making (Acheson 1975, Ostrom 1990). 
3. Existence of a cohesive social system based on kinship,
ethnicity, or homogeneous gear. Commonly held values about
how to fish can emerge either from family or social group
ties or from being part of an organization representing the
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Table 7. Original institutional loss, visions, strategies, and actions to rebuild institutions.
 
Broughton clam group North coast group
Institutional losses,
vacuums, and
vulnerabilities
Minimal community representation in management process
Declining observation of traditional management practices
Loss of access to resources
Loss of abundance of resource
Loss of health of resource
Loss of capacity and transportation
Loss of mechanism for community representation in
management process (vacuum), loss of influence, loss of
capacity
Vision Take back control over local natural resources, be able to
protect territory and exercise traditional protocols
Make policies for region that benefit communities
Strategies Document and formalize traditional protocols Increase salmon abundance; ensure fair allocation;
aboriginal comanagement
Actions Engage in research partnership with universities
Maintain planning focus on core values and interests
Planning, research, monitoring, some harvest management;
research partnerships
interests and concerns of a particular type of fisherman such
as a salmon gillnetter. The cohesiveness of the group lends
strength to the values, norms, and rules it produces
(Pinkerton 1989). 
4. Existence of mechanisms for conserving and enhancing a
fishery that can at the same time conserve and enhance the
operation of a cultural system (Pinkerton 1989). As
exemplified especially by the Broughton clam group,
rebuilding the traditional cultural system of access and
management protocols would automatically produce the
sustainable management and best practices that the system
was originally designed to achieve. 
5. Existence of legitimate and effective leadership at local and
regional levels, i.e., a dedicated person or core group applying
consistent pressure to advance the process (Pinkerton 1989).
Leadership in fisheries management from both the
UFAWU-UNIFOR and the Native Brotherhood of BC is
particularly strong in the north coast group, especially in the
form of an energy center with four decades of experience
dedicated to pursuing the goals. Leadership at multiple
scales is important and may not be consistently present at
local scales. The existence of such fisheries leadership is only
now beginning to emerge in the Broughton Archipelago. 
6. Achievement of local consensus on the importance of
management protocols and traditional territorial rights. This
produces the type of multiparty agreements that Poncelet
(2001) and Pinkerton (2007) identified as playing an
inherently powerful role in influencing government policy
decisions. This goal appears achievable within the
Broughton clam group and also among participants in the
north coast group. The challenge will be to persuade the
other claimants to the salmon and clams to recognize and
respect what the clam group’s management protocols and
the north coast group’s approaches have to contribute to
sustainable management. 
7. Exertion of management rights in addition to or even instead
of access rights. The north coast member organizations have
always exerted access rights and are only recently exerting a
wide range of management rights. The Broughton clam
group is in the fairly unusual position of currently taking
the moral high ground, exerting only management rights,
that is, protecting the beaches and practicing protocols,
separately from and not directly tied to access rights. This
may help them in asserting the moral legitimacy of their
claim. 
8. Ability to articulate a coherent and consistent vision that can
be clearly translated to government and the public (Pinkerton
1993). The ability of these coalitions to persuade other
claimants to recognize the legitimacy of the coalitions will
be influenced by their ability to clearly explain the value of
their vision to government and the local public. In the
process, they may be able to build issue networks with
government scientists and managers, showing how their
coalition can solve specific problems. 
9. Ability to form issue networks. Heclo (1978) identifies issue
networks as a major source of reform pressure for
governmental processes that have previously been
dominated by a few economic players. Issue networks are
formed when experienced government personnel, public
sector leaders, academics, independent consultants, and
nonaligned scientists familiar with research, technical
information, and alternative working models generate a free
and lively debate about policy and technical alternatives. The
ability of an issue network to combine such diverse resources
effectively allows it both to produce and legitimize workable
models. The DFO and the north coast group appear to be
developing an issue network to a moderate degree, but it is
too early for this to happen with the Broughton clam group. 
10. Ability to form coalitions at the local, regional, provincial,
national, and international levels. Coalition formation is
happening at different scales in the two regions. Because
both the UFAWU-UNIFOR and the Native Brotherhood
of BC are province-wide organizations, they are able to form
coalitions on the BC north coast and enjoy moral support
provincially. As part of the Canadian Council of
Professional Fish Harvesters, the UFAWU-UNIFOR and
the Native Brotherhood of BC participate in a national
coalition, and our partnership research is part of a national
research network: the Canadian Fisheries Research
Network. The Broughton clam group is just beginning to be
part of an international research network on small-scale
fisheries called Too Big to Ignore. Both research projects are
documenting the value and role of such fisheries in coastal
communities, regional economies, and nation states. 
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Table 8. Resources that support rebuilding local fisheries management institutions: assessment and comparison of north coast and
clam groups. DFO = Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans.
 
Resource North coast group Clam group
Identification with place Strong (Doing) Strong (Doing)
Influential local community values Strong (Doing) Strong (Doing)
Cohesive social system Building Strong (Doing)
Legitimate and effective leadership in fisheries management Strong Building
Historical experience and success with comanagement institutions
with DFO
Building Planning
Capacity for political mobilization around fisheries issues Strong (Doing) Planning
External support Building Planning
Access to financial, logistical, and technical resources Building Planning
Institutional capacity in senior governments (staffing, budgets,
function)
Diminishing Planning
Government representatives trained to work with fishermen and
communities
Building Planning
Statutory, regulatory, or policy support for local interests and values Building Building
Motivating crisis Strong Strong
11. Ability to demonstrate that radical reform is necessary and
not being addressed (Pinkerton 1992).The north coast group
is demonstrating this to its own membership but not yet to
outsiders. The Broughton clam group is raising the issue of
salmon farm pollution of clam beaches through its
environmental and other aboriginal allies, which may
position it to raise other issues. 
12. Capacity for political mobilization. Submissions to the
hearings of the Joint Review Panel on the proposed
Enbridge Northern Gateway pipeline and associated tanker
transportation to China for Alberta bitumen illustrated the
capacity of the north coast group to mobilize local protest
around habitat protection issues. The Broughton clam group
is not at this stage yet, but may become involved with the
Coastal Guardian Watchmen for training and development
of monitoring capacity. 
13. Access to public forums of debate and dissemination of
opinion. The north coast group has access to local newspaper
and radio forums on the north coast and uses them to a
limited extent, but has not yet entered into debate in the
public arena. The Broughton clam group uses social media
for internal debate among member nations only. A recent
challenge by a neighboring aboriginal nation over territorial
ownership rights appears to be stimulating greater use of
public forums, however, and this may be beneficial in the
long run for the public discussion of management protocols. 
14. Access to financial and logistical resources, such as
volunteerism and political will, that enable a community or
region to organize itself effectively. Both organizations are
financially pressed and surviving through political will and
significant volunteerism, especially the north coast group. 
15. Capacity to do asset mapping. Asset mapping combines all
sources of physical, human, social, and cultural capital. The
extensive assets held by both organizations, such as place-
based knowledge of ecosystems, closely knit kinship
networks, past sustainable management skills, and so forth,
offer key assets for effective local management. A thorough
appreciation of those assets is helpful in creating the
priorities that allow an organization to play to its strengths
(Kretzmann and McKnight 1993). Both organizations
appear to have this appreciation.
External political conditions
1. Existence of a crisis pushing people to take action and
overcome local differences (Pinkerton 1989). In both
organizations there is a sense of urgency that it is now or
never. If  they do not take immediate action, the opportunity
to rebuild their institutions will be lost. This situation is
positive in that external threats can provide a powerful
motivation for local factions to unite to protect their
mutually held values and interests. 
2. Existence of external support. Examples include university
researchers, nongovernment scientists, credible organizations,
and external forums of discussion such as issue networks. 
3. Alliances with stakeholders, nongovernmental organizations,
and agencies with complementary resources, especially when
these parties form issue networks that generate new technical
information and alternative models. An environmental
nongovernmental organization, Ecotrust, is supportive of
the north coast group, and a prominent independent
scientist, Alexandra Morton, is supportive of the clam
group. The clam group is in the process of setting up a
meeting with stakeholders in their area to explore common
concerns and mutual support. 
4. Access to and use of multiple sources of power. These sources,
including courts, legislatures, public boards, and citizens’
initiatives at strategic times, create a spillover effect from one
to another. The western Washington treaty tribes were
particularly successful in asserting a high level of
comanagement rights through access to multiple forms of
power (Pinkerton 1992). It is not clear to us that either
organization currently has such access.
Conditions in government agencies
1. Loss of institutional capacity in government resulting from
job cuts and reorganization. This leads to less ability of
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Table 9. Activities that support rebuilding local fisheries management institutions: assessment and comparison of Skeena and Broughton
regions.
 
Activity North coast
group
Broughton Clam group
Building coalitions at local and regional levels Doing Planning on some issues
Forming alliances with stakeholders, NGOs and agencies with
complementary resources
Building Building on habitat protection; Planning on
other issues
Creating issue networks with government and academic experts Building Building
Accessing media and public space Doing Planning
Accessing multiple sources of power Building Building
Identifying and fostering positive feedback loops between ecological and
social systems (how cultural system can support institutional rebuilding)
Planning Doing
Articulating coherent and consistent vision for government and public Building Building
Demonstrating necessity for radical reform and absence of progress Building Planning
Exerting management rights over and above access rights Building Building de facto, planning de jure
government to deal with policy or operational decisions
affecting local management. Although a deficit in the short
term, this condition may be a blessing in the long term in
that it can mobilize local communities to step into the
breach. The lack of DFO funding to start a Clam Board in
the Broughton Archipelago is a barrier for the clam group
but could allow them to take a leadership role regarding
regional issues. The north coast group may be able to play
a larger management role because of DFO absence from its
previous management activities. 
2. Lack of training of government managers to work with
fishermen or communities, despite policies to do so. This lack
of training results in the low likelihood that community
values or capacity to participate in management will be
understood or incorporated into management decisions
(Sharp and Lach 2003). This condition exists most strongly
in the Broughton area, although it is not absent in the
Skeena. 
3. Government’s behavioral bias toward the fragmentation of
responsibilities and authorities (Yaffee 1997, Pinkerton
2007). This inhibits the development of the integrated
comanagement process that is sought by both organizations.
CONCLUSIONS
Tables 8 and 9 summarize the resources available to the north
coast and Broughton clam groups, and the activities each
organization is undertaking to achieve its goals in rebuilding its
own collapsed institutions or in rebuilding comanagement
institutions (“doing” in Tables 8 and 9). Both organizations face
the dilemma of deciding whether to focus limited time and
resources on acquiring or mobilizing more of the resources they
need or to take more actions that are likely to advance their
objectives. Both organizations probably have sufficient favorable
conditions to achieve their goals but would likely benefit from
asset mapping to make difficult decisions about the trade-offs.
Although both organizations need financial resources, their need
for external support in the form of alliances, issue networks, and
sources of power is far greater and finances do not automatically
deliver these. Much of the comanagement literature suggests that
this strategy can significantly enhance the successful assertion of
comanagement rights that enable institutional rebuilding.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/6489
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